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This article discusses the practical consequences of the District of Colorado’s partial rejection of Colo. 




On November 6, 2012, Colorado voters added Amendment 64 to 
Colorado’s constitution.1 Amendment 64 legalizes many aspects of, and 
requires regulation for, the personal use (for adults 21 and over), commercial 
cultivation, manufacture, and sale of marijuana. Following an 
implementation period, the first recreational stores officially opened on 
January 1, 2014, and the industry has been growing since then. This occurred 
against the conspicuous backdrop of federal law, specifically the Controlled 
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Substances Act, 21 USC §§ 801 et seq. (CSA), which makes illegal all of the 
above-described personal and commercial conduct relating to marijuana.  
Rather than invoke the Supremacy Clause and assert that the CSA 
preempts conflicting state law, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has 
attempted to provide guidance in a series of memoranda. While affirming the 
DOJ’s authority to enforce the CSA, the memoranda suggest that direct 
enforcement is not a high priority for the federal government in states that 
have legalized or decriminalized marijuana and have their own effective 
regulatory systems.2 Nevertheless, the tenor of these oft-quoted documents 
is advisory and interpretive, underscoring the ephemeral nature of any 
wisdom divined from them. The reaction of the federal executive branch thus 
is impermanent and uncertain on several levels. 
Before recent amendments, Colorado lawyers wishing to represent clients 
in the growing marijuana industry faced a serious impediment arising from 
the conflict between the CSA and Amendment 64. Colorado Rule of 
Professional Conduct (Colo. RPC or Rule) 1.2(d) states:  
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct 
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss 
the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client 
and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine 
the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.3  
Because the CSA criminalizes conduct permitted under Amendment 64, 
a straightforward reading of Colo. RPC 1.2(d) suggested that a lawyer 
counseling or assisting a client with respect to conduct consistent with 
Amendment 64 was in violation of the Rule.4 On the other hand, reading 
Colo. RPC 1.2(d) to deny clients the assistance of lawyers in navigating a 
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On March 24, 2014, the Colorado Supreme Court undertook an effort to 
reduce uncertainty for Colorado attorneys wishing to represent clients in 
connection with Amendment 64 by adding Comment 14 to Colo. RPC 1.2(d). 
Comment 14 created an exception to Rule 1.2(d). It states in relevant part 
that a lawyer may 
assist a client in conduct that the lawyer reasonably believes is permitted 
by these constitutional provisions [Amendment 64, §§ 14 & 16] and the 
statutes, regulations, orders, and other state or local provisions 
implementing them. In these circumstances, the lawyer shall also advise 
the client regarding related federal law and policy.6 
Comment 14 thus removed some uncertainty by clarifying that Colorado 
attorneys (at least under Colorado law) are permitted to “assist” clients with 
conduct related to Amendment 64. The Court, however, did not define 
“assist” and left the contours of acceptable representation consistent with 
Colo. RPC 1.2(d) and Comment 14 to the common law and/or future 
regulation.  
On November 17, 2014, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Colorado (USDC) announced that it had “reviewed and approved revisions 
to its Local Rules which bec[a]me effective December 1, 2014.” While the 
USDC has adopted most of the Colo. RPC as its rules,7 it added a new 
exception to Local Attorney Rule 2(b), stating: 
Exceptions. The following provisions of the Colorado Rules of 
Professional Conduct (Colo. RPC) are excluded from the standards of 
professional responsibility for the United States District Court and the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado:  
Colo. RPC 1.2(d), Comment [14] (counseling and assisting client 
regarding Colorado Constitution art. XVIII, §§ 14 and 16 and related 
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implementing them), except that a lawyer may advise a client regarding 
the validity, scope, and meaning of Colorado Constitution art. XVIII, §§ 
14 and 16 and the statutes, regulations, orders, and other state or local 
provisions implementing them, and, in these circumstances, the lawyer 
shall also advise the client regarding related federal law and policy.8 
Importantly, with respect to the application of the Local Attorney Rules, 
Rule 1(c) provides: 
Scope. These rules shall apply to all attorneys who are admitted to the bar 
of this court, or who purport to appear in the United States District Court 
or the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado.9 
The Colorado Supreme Court’s adoption of Comment 14 and the USDC’s 
subsequent rejection of Comment 14 have created an uncertain playing field 
for Colorado lawyers admitted to practice in the USDC who wish to represent 
clients in Amendment 64 matters. Specifically, these lawyers face two 
challenges. First, which jurisdiction’s rules of professional conduct apply to 
their representation of clients in the marijuana industry—the Colo. RPC, 
which permit assisting such clients, or the USDC Local Attorney Rules, 
which prohibit assistance? Second, if the USDC Local Attorney Rules apply, 
what is the scope of permitted advice regarding related federal law and policy 
as opposed to (the at least negatively implied) prohibited assistance? Both of 
these thorny issues are explored below. 
 
Reconciling Colo. RPC 8.5, USDC Local Attorney Rule 8.5, 
and the USDC’s Inherent Power 
Consider the following examples: Suppose Colorado is sued in USDC by 
sheriffs from Colorado and neighboring states arguing that Amendment 64 
puts an undue economic burden on other states.10 Attorney A is admitted in 
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Attorney A violated the USDC Local Attorney Rules by representing 
Colorado? 
Attorney B represents Client X, a marijuana dispensary owner, 
negotiating a commercial real estate lease. Attorney B is admitted in the 
USDC and represents Client Y in an unrelated litigation matter pending 
before the USDC. Has Attorney B violated the USDC Local Attorney Rules 
by representing Client X? 
Having not opted out of Colo. RPC 8.5, the USDC is bound by its 
provisions.11 Colo. RPC 8.5(a) deals with disciplinary authority and states in 
relevant part:  
A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the 
disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the 
lawyer’s conduct occurs. . . . A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary 
authority of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the same 
conduct.12  
The rule provides that an attorney’s conduct is subject to discipline in 
“this jurisdiction” regardless of where the conduct occurs. The plain 
language of the rule establishes that because Attorneys A and B are admitted 
to practice before the USDC, they are both subject to the disciplinary 
authority of the court. The pertinent question becomes: Which rules of 
professional conduct would the USDC apply if it were to discipline Attorneys 
A and B? Is it the Colo. RPC, which permit, per Comment 14, attorneys’ 
assistance to Amendment 64 clients, or its Local Attorney Rules, which reject 
Comment 14 and therefore prohibit it? Clearly, only one set of rules of 
professional conduct may apply to any particular attorney conduct.13 
Colo. RPC 8.5(b), adopted by the USDC, provides choice of law 
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[F]or conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the 
rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits [apply], unless the rules 
of the tribunal provide otherwise.14 
Rule 8.5(b)(2) adds: 
[F]or any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer’s 
conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a 
different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the 
conduct. A lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer’s 
conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer 
reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer’s conduct will 
occur.15  
Because Attorney A is representing Colorado in a matter pending before 
the USDC, Rule 8.5(b)(1) means that the USDC would apply its Local 
Attorney Rule 2(b) to determine whether Attorney A committed misconduct. 
Attorney B’s representation, however, presents a more complicated choice 
of law question because the representation of Client X is not before the 
USDC. 
On the one hand, a plain reading of Colo. RPC 8.5 suggests that where 
the representation of clients in the marijuana industry is not “in connection 
with a matter pending before” the USDC, the USDC must apply, per Rule 
8.5(b)(2), “the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer’s conduct 
occurred,” namely the Colo. RPC. Here, because Attorney B’s conduct—the 
representation of Client X—is not pending before the USDC, the Colo. RPC 
that permit the representation would apply. Colo. RPC 8.5(b)(2) does not 
allow a court to discipline an attorney if the attorney’s conduct conforms to 
the rules of the jurisdiction in which the attorney reasonably believed the 
predominant effect of the conduct would occur, therefore the USDC would 
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Indeed, federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. These 
courts have jurisdiction over cases between residents of different states and 
that exceed $75,000, cases that concern a federal question, and bankruptcy 
cases for which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction.17 It is thus 
axiomatic that the USDC does not have jurisdiction over all claims arising in 
the State of Colorado. In light of this limited jurisdiction, Attorney B might 
reasonably conclude that her representation of Client X would not have a 
nexus to any matter pending before the USDC and, further, that the USDC 
must apply Colo. RPC 8.5(b)(2) and decline to assert jurisdiction over her 
conduct.  
On the other hand, the USDC might decide to exercise its inherent power 
to apply its Local Attorney Rules, Colo. RPC 8.5 notwithstanding, finding 
that any other construction would deny its ability to discipline lawyers 
admitted to its bar and force it to apply Colo. RPC 1.2 Comment 14, which 
it explicitly rejected. The USDC has the power to discipline or disbar 
attorneys admitted to practice before it.18 Nothing in the Local Rules negates 
or diminishes the USDC’s inherent power to discipline attorneys who are 
members of its bar.19 This disciplinary and contempt power is “far-reaching 
and potentially drastic.”20 Thus, while contemplating what rules the USDC 
will apply, it is incumbent on attorneys practicing before it to recognize that 
the court may invoke its inherent power to apply its Local Rule 2(b), 
ostensibly even to attorney conduct in matters not pending before it.21 Here, 
if the USDC were to invoke its inherent power to disregard its own Rule 
8.5(b)(2), Attorney B’s representation of Client X would be subject to Local 
Rule 2(b) although the representation of Client X was not before the tribunal 
and was unrelated to its representation of Client Y before the court.  
In sum, Colorado lawyers admitted to practice before the USDC assume 
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before the USDC, the court will apply its Local Rules 8.5(b)(1) and 2(b) to 
reject Comment 14. In matters not pending before it the USDC is likely to 
interpret its Rule 8.5(b)(2) and apply the Colo. RPC in full, including 
Comment 14. However, it may invoke its inherent power to apply its own 
Local Rule 2(b) to such representations. We turn next to explore the 
application of Local Rule 2(b) to the representation of Amendment 64 
clients.  
 
Semantics or Substance? Discuss v. Assist/Counsel v. 
Advise 
Colorado lawyers who fear discipline by the USDC must confront a 
second quandary: What is the scope of permitted advising under the Local 
Attorney Rules as opposed to prohibited assisting? In attempting to navigate 
the issues described above, attorneys may refrain from assisting clients 
regarding Amendment 64 and only advise them, in accordance with Local 
Attorney Rule 2(b)(2). The USDC rejected Comment 14 to the extent that it 
permitted an attorney to assist a client regarding Amendment 64, but 
accepted that an attorney could advise his or her client regarding Amendment 
64 and related federal law and policy.22 Further, the USDC has adopted Colo. 
RPC 1.2(d), which states that while a “lawyer shall not counsel a client to 
engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal,” a 
lawyer 
may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct 
with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort 
to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.23 
This requires an analysis of the difference between three categories of 
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Discussing  
Colo. RPC 1.2(d), adopted by the USDC, states in relevant part that a 
lawyer “may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of 
conduct with a client.”24 Thus, a lawyer may discuss and explain to a client 
the legal consequences of any conduct given Amendment 64, the CSA, and 
related bodies of law. Comment 9 clarifies that, in discussing the law with a 
client, a lawyer is not precluded “from giving an honest opinion about the 
actual consequences that appear likely to result from a client’s conduct.”25 It 
adds that “[t]here is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of 
legal aspects of questionable conduct,”26 which is permitted under the Rule, 
“and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be 
committed with impunity,”27 which is prohibited. 
 
Assisting and Counseling  
While a Colorado lawyer is thus always permitted to discuss the 
consequences of a proposed Amendment 64 conduct with a client under the 
Local Attorney Rules, an attorney must not assist or counsel a client to 
engage in violating the CSA given the USDC’s rejection of Comment 14. 
What attorney conduct amounts to prohibited assisting and counseling? 
Comment 10 to Colo. RPC 1.2 offers guidance in drawing the line, noting 
that 
[t]he lawyer is required to avoid assisting the client, for example, by 
drafting or delivering documents that the lawyer knows are fraudulent or 
by suggesting how the wrongdoing might be concealed.28 
By analogy, a lawyer prohibited from assisting Amendment 64 client conduct 
under Local Rule 2(b)(2) would be prohibited from drafting or delivering 
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drafting a lease or an employment agreement on behalf of a marijuana 
dispensary owner. 
CBA Formal Ethics Opinion 125 delineated the line between prohibited 
assistance and permitted Amendment 64 representations. The Opinion was 
rendered moot by Comment 14 and was therefore withdrawn. But because 
the USDC’s rejection of Comment 14 once again makes it important to 
distinguish between prohibited assistance and permitted representation, we 
believe it provides good guidance and lends ample support for the above 
interpretation.29 The Opinion stated in relevant part: 
Circumstances in which the question [distinguishing permissible attorney 
conduct and prohibited conduct] arises are too various to permit a single, 
bright-line answer. It must suffice to describe a spectrum of conduct 
starting with conduct which the Committee believes is unquestionably 
permissible, ending with conduct which the Committee believes is 
undoubtedly unethical, and circling back to the range of conduct in 
between as to which reasonable minds may differ.  
It is, for example, unquestionably permissible for lawyers to represent 
clients regarding the consequences of their past conduct. Just as a lawyer 
may ethically defend a client accused of committing a crime, so too may 
a lawyer ethically represent a client accused of violating Colorado’s rules 
and regulations regarding marijuana, in any area in which that conduct 
may become an issue—including family law, employment law, workers’ 
compensation law, and criminal law.  
Opinion 125’s analysis does not quite resolve our first example. The 
Opinion states that a lawyer can always represent a client accused of a crime, 
but it bases its conclusion on the fact that the client’s conduct in question is 
past conduct. Attorney A, in contrast, has been retained by Colorado to 
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A has likely not violated the USDC’s Local Rules for two related reasons. 
First, the court’s Local Rules allow a lawyer to “counsel or assist a client to 
make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or 
application of the law.”30 Because in our example the sheriffs are challenging 
the validity and application of Amendment 64, it seems likely that that court 
will not find Attorney A’s representation of Colorado to violate its Local 
Rules.  
Support for this analysis is found in the recent case of In re Arenas, 
dismissing a debtor’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy and denying his motion to 
convert to a Chapter 13 on the basis that the debtor’s compliance with 
Amendment 64 of Colorado in running his marijuana business constituted 
violations of the CSA, and permitting a bankruptcy would require the 
bankruptcy trustee to distribute assets that were the result of illegal 
conduct.31 Importantly, while the court denied the debtor’s motion for relief, 
it did not refer debtor’s counsel for discipline, presumably because the 
lawyer in question was assisting the client “to make a good faith effort to 
determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.” 
Second, disciplining Attorney A for agreeing to represent Colorado in our 
example defies common sense because such discipline would deprive 
Colorado of representation in the case. But what about Colorado lawyers who 
generally agree to represent Amendment 64 clients before the USDC in 
matters involving ongoing—as opposed to past—client conduct? While such 
lawyers might argue that the representations constitute “a good faith effort to 
determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law,” and might 
construe In re Arenas to suggest that the USDC would not refer them to 
discipline, such lawyers do risk a determination that their representations 
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Next, what about lawyers who represent Amendment 64 clients in matters 
not before the court, like Attorney B? Withdrawn Opinion 125 is once again 
helpful in construing Local Rule 2(b):  
By contrast, the Committee concludes that the plain language of Colo. 
RPC 1.2(d) prohibits lawyers from assisting clients in structuring or 
implementing transactions which by themselves violate federal law. A 
lawyer cannot comply with Colo. RPC 1.2(d) and, for example, draft or 
negotiate (1) contracts to facilitate the purchase and sale of marijuana or 
(2) leases for properties or facilities, or contracts for resources or supplies, 
that clients intend to use to cultivate, manufacture, distribute, or sell 
marijuana, even though such transactions comply with Colorado law, and 
even though the law or the transaction may be so complex that a lawyer’s 
assistance would be useful, because the lawyer would be assisting the 
client in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal under federal law. 
Similarly, a lawyer cannot under Colo. RPC 1.2(d) represent the lessor or 
supplier in such a transaction if the lawyer knows the client’s intended 
use of the property, facilities, or supplies, as such actions are likely to 
constitute aiding and abetting the violation of or conspiracy to violate 
federal law.32 
Accordingly, because negotiating a commercial real estate lease for 
Client X constitutes prohibited assistance under USDC’s Local Rule 2(b), if 
the court were to invoke its inherent power and attempt to discipline Attorney 
B for conduct not pending before it, Attorney B might be found to have 
violated Rule 2(b). Notably, however, the Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers § 94 defines “assistance” differently than withdrawn 
Opinion 125. Assisting a client under the Restatement means to, with the 
intent of facilitating or encouraging the client’s action, as opposed to mere 
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drafting correspondence, negotiating with a non-client, or contacting a 
governmental agency.”33 That is, drafting and preparing documents on behalf 
of a client only amounts to assisting if a lawyer acts with intent to help the 
client, as opposed to mere knowledge of the client’s criminal conduct.34 
Contrary to Colo. RPC 1.2 Comment 10 and withdrawn Ethics Opinion 125, 
a Colorado lawyer facing USDC discipline for drafting documents for an 
Amendment 64 client may argue that her conduct does not constitute 
prohibited assistance because she lacked the intent to help the client.  
Here, Attorney B may argue that even if the USDC invokes its inherent 
power and attempts to impose discipline for conduct not before it, Attorney 
B has not violated Local Rule 2(b) unless it can be established that Attorney 
B had the intent to help Client Y. In any event, recall that as explained above, 
when the representation of Amendment 64 clients is not before it, the USDC 
might interpret its choice of law Rule 8.5(b)(2) to require it to apply the Colo. 
RPC, including Comment 14, in which case it will likely find no misconduct 
on Attorney B’s part. 
Advising 
Local Attorney Rule 2(b)(2) appears to introduce a new hybrid 
category—advise. Recall that the Local Rule states in relevant part that a 
lawyer “may advise a client” regarding the validity, scope, and meaning of 
Amendment 64 and its implementing laws, and must “advise the client 
regarding related federal law and policy.” Thus, arguably, a Colorado lawyer 
may do more than merely discuss the legal consequences with an 
Amendment 64 client, but less than assist or counsel that client. 
Once again the Colo. RPC Comment and withdrawn Ethics Opinion 125 
provide guidance in delineating the meaning of this new category of conduct. 
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[t]here is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal 
aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which 
a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity.” (Emphasis 
added.)35 
“Recommending the means” is prohibited by Comment 9 because it, unlike 
Local Rule 2(b)(2), had only two categories of attorney conduct to 
construe—discussing and assisting—and recommending appeared to go 
above and beyond discussing. The USDC, however, may conclude that 
recommending is an example of permitted advising because while more than 
discussing, it is sufficiently less than assisting. 
Opinion 125 provided two additional examples of advising. First, it 
explained: 
The CSA provides that “no civil or criminal liability shall be imposed by 
virtue of this subchapter upon . . . any duly authorized officer of any State 
. . . who shall be lawfully engaged in the enforcement of any law or 
municipal ordinance relating to controlled substances.” 21 U.S.C. § 
885(d). Some courts have interpreted this section to provide civil and 
criminal immunity for state law enforcement officers enforcing valid state 
marijuana laws.36 
Importantly, added the Opinion, 
state officials carrying out their responsibilities under Colorado’s 
marijuana laws are not engaging in criminal activity. Relying on these 
cases, the Committee believes that government lawyers advising these 
officials do not violate Colo. RPC 1.2(d) when they work to help their 
clients enforce, interpret, or apply marijuana laws. (Emphasis added.)37 
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in the family law context, a lawyer may advise a client about the 
consequences of using marijuana before, during, or after exercising 
parental rights or parenting time without violating the Rules.38 
Thus, it appears that permissible advising under Local Attorney Rule 
2(b)(2) creates a third hybrid category of attorney conduct, in addition to 
discussing and assisting, pursuant to which a Colorado lawyer may do more 
than discuss the consequences of a proposed course of conduct with an 
Amendment 64 client without reaching the prohibited assisting, for example, 
by recommending a course of conduct based on the permitted discussion. 
 
Conclusion 
The USDC’s rejection of Comment 14 introduces uncertainty into the 
practice of law for Colorado lawyers admitted to practice before the USDC. 
Specifically, while we believe that the court’s choice of law rule requires it 
to apply the Colorado Rules to attorney conduct not pending before it, 
lawyers admitted to practice before the USDC face the possibility that the 
court may exercise jurisdiction to discipline them for representing 
Amendment 64 clients in matters pending before it and even regarding 
representations not before it. In doing so, it might apply its Local Attorney 
Rules, which reject Comment 14. Moreover, Colorado lawyers also face 
uncertainty as to the scope of permitted advising under the Local Attorney 
Rules, as well as the scope of prohibited assisting. 
 
Notes 
1. In this article, “Amendment 64” refers to the constitutional 
amendment, inclusive of the statutory and regulatory schemes 
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14. Colo. RPC 8.5(b)(1). 
15. Colo. RPC 8.5(b)(2). 
16. Colo. RPC 8.5(b)(2), cmt. [3] (the purpose of Colo. RPC 8.5 is to 
protect attorneys who act reasonably in the face of uncertainty). 
17. See 28 USC §§ 1331, 1332, and 1334. 
18. The U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized the inherent power 
of the federal district courts to disbar or discipline attorneys before them. 
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